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Competition and Consumer Protection in 
the 21st Century  
1	  
America  has  a  market  power  problem
•  Both	  monopoly	  and	  monopsony	  power	  
•  Evident	  that	  current	  an7-­‐trust/compe77on	  laws,	  as	  they	  are	  enforced	  and	  have	  
been	  interpreted,	  are	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  ensuring	  a	  compe77ve	  market	  place	  
•  If	  standard	  “compe77ve	  analysis	  tools”	  don’t	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  problem,	  it	  suggests	  
that	  something	  may	  be	  wrong	  with	  the	  tools	  
•  Many	  changes	  in	  our	  understandings	  of	  economics,	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  
“innova7ons”	  in	  an7-­‐compe77ve	  prac7ces:	  	  compe77on	  law	  has	  not	  kept	  up	  
•  Much	  of	  current	  presump7ons/law	  influenced	  by	  “Chicago”	  school	  
•  The	  compe77ve	  equilibrium	  model	  is	  not	  robust	  
•  The	  model	  provides	  a	  poor	  descrip7on	  of	  the	  economy	  
•  Any	  legal	  framework	  based	  on	  that	  as	  the	  underlying	  model	  will	  not	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  
ensuring	  a	  compe77ve	  market	  place	  well	  
Broad  economic  and  poli6cal  consequences
Economic	  consequences	  
• Reduces	  opportunity—as	  a	  result	  of	  important	  barriers	  to	  entry	  
• Unlevel	  playing	  field—market	  power	  can	  lead	  to	  growth	  not	  based	  on	  efficiencies	  
•  Lower	  cost	  of	  capital	  of	  large	  banks	  as	  a	  result	  of	  implicit	  “too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail”	  guarantee	  
	  
Poli7cal	  consequences	  
• Concentra7on	  of	  economic	  power	  is	  translated	  into	  poli7cal,	  undermining	  democracy	  	  
• Broad	  sense	  of	  powerlessness	  in	  society	  System	  is	  “rigged”	  and	  unfair	  
	  
All	  of	  these	  were	  among	  original	  concerns	  of	  an7-­‐trust	  law	  
• Focus	  has	  been	  unnecessarily	  narrowed	  
• Most	  of	  this	  talk	  will	  focus	  narrowly	  on	  conven7onal	  economics	  
Failures  of  compe66on  show  up  at  macroeconomic  level
• Growing	  inequality	  
•  Lower	  investment	  
• Reduced	  innova7on	  
• Decreasing	  entry	  and	  growth	  of	  small	  businesses	  
•  Not	  only	  source,	  but	  an	  important	  contributor	  to	  many	  of	  these	  trends	  
• Broad	  inefficiencies	  
•  Efficiency	  of	  market	  economy	  based	  on	  individuals/firms	  facing	  same	  price	  
•  Price	  discrimina7on	  undermines	  “fundamental	  theorem	  of	  welfare	  economics”	  
•  Except	  in	  limi7ng	  case	  of	  perfect	  discrimina7on,	  aTempt	  to	  extract	  more	  consumer	  or	  
producer	  surplus	  distorts	  economy	  
	  
Lack  of  compe66on  in  many  sectors  evident  






In	  many	  cases,	  lack	  of	  compe77on	  has	  to	  be	  assessed	  at	  local	  level	  
•  Small	  businesses	  in	  many	  locales	  have	  only	  one	  or	  two	  providers	  of	  
loans	  
But  lack  of  choice  is  o?en  hidden  




• Dog	  food,	  baTeries	  and	  coffins	  
Broader  evidence  of  increase  in  market  power
•  Data	  on	  increased	  concentra7on	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  sectors	  
•  Increased	  mark-­‐ups	  in	  many	  sectors	  
•  And	  typically	  linked	  to	  increased	  concentra7on	  
•  In	  many	  sectors,	  pervasive	  price	  discrimina7on	  
•  Recall:	  	  in	  compe77ve	  model,	  no	  firm	  has	  ability	  to	  raise	  price	  above	  marginal	  costs,	  so	  all	  
should	  face	  same	  price	  (unless	  different	  costs	  of	  serving	  different	  customers)	  
•  Increased	  share	  of	  “rents”	  
•  Share	  of	  labor	  and	  capital	  (appropriately	  measured,	  but	  including	  intangibles)	  both	  falling	  
•  Only	  part	  of	  increased	  rents	  aTributable	  to	  increased	  land	  rents—increased	  monopoly	  rents	  
major	  source	  
•  Reflec7ng	  increased	  shared	  of	  corporate	  profits	  
•  Corroborated	  by	  data	  on	  high	  returns	  
•  Beyond	  that	  which	  can	  be	  jus7fied	  by	  risk	  
•  Yet	  o\en	  limited	  entry	  
Explaining  some  of  nega6ve  macroeconomic  
consequences
• Downward	  sloping	  demand	  curves	  result	  in	  marginal	  return	  to	  
investment	  being	  lower	  than	  average	  return	  
•  Consistent	  with	  investment	  being	  weak	  even	  as	  profit	  share	  increases	  
• Constructed	  barriers	  to	  entry	  discourage	  entry	  and	  innova7on	  
•  Remarkably	  liTle	  entry	  into	  some	  very	  highly	  profitable	  sectors	  
•  Even	  though	  there	  has	  been	  high	  levels	  of	  innova7on	  in	  “neighboring”	  sectors	  
Firms  have  strong  incen6ves  to  engage  in  
an6-­‐compe66ve  behavior
•  Longstanding	  presump7on	  da7ng	  back	  to	  Adam	  Smith	  (1776)	  
“People	  of	  the	  same	  trade	  seldom	  meet	  together,	  even	  for	  merriment	  and	  diversion,	  
but	  the	  conversa7on	  ends	  in	  a	  conspiracy	  against	  the	  public,	  or	  in	  some	  contrivance	  to	  
raise	  prices”	  
Businessmen	  not	  only	  made	  their	  profits	  by	  taking	  advantage	  of	  their	  
customers,	  but	  also	  by	  taking	  advantage	  of	  their	  workers:	  
“Masters	  are	  always	  and	  everywhere	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  tacit,	  but	  constant	  and	  uniform,	  
combina7on,	  not	  to	  raise	  the	  wages	  of	  labour	  above	  their	  actual	  rate	  [...]	  Masters,	  too,	  
some7mes	  enter	  into	  par7cular	  combina7ons	  to	  sink	  the	  wages	  of	  labour	  even	  below	  
this	  rate.	  These	  are	  always	  conducted	  with	  the	  utmost	  silence	  and	  secrecy.”	  
Our  business  leaders  understand  this
Peter	  Thiel:	  
	  	  “compe77on	  is	  for	  losers.”	  
Warren	  BuffeT	  
“The	  single	  most	  important	  decision	  in	  evalua7ng	  a	  business	  is	  pricing	  power.	  	  If	  you’ve	  got	  the	  
power	  to	  raise	  prices	  without	  losing	  business	  to	  a	  compe7tor,	  you’ve	  got	  a	  very	  good	  business.	  	  
If	  you’ve	  got	  a	  good	  enough	  business,	  if	  you	  have	  a	  monopoly	  newspaper	  or	  if	  you	  have	  a	  
network	  television	  sta7on,	  your	  idiot	  nephew	  could	  run	  it.”	  
Describing	  an	  entry	  barrier	  	  like	  being	  surrounded	  by	  a	  moat:	  
	  
“[We]	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  that	  moat	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  keep	  its	  width	  and	  its	  impossibility	  of	  being	  
crossed.	  	  We	  tell	  our	  manager	  we	  want	  the	  moat	  widened	  every	  year.”	  
Major	  source	  of	  innova7on	  in	  US	  is	  the	  construc7on	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  entry	  barrier,	  
ideas	  that	  are	  transmiTed	  throughout	  economy	  (including	  by	  our	  business	  
schools).	  
	  
Mul6ple  forces  underlying  growth  in  market  power
•  Structure	  of	  demand	  
•  Towards	  local	  services,	  in	  which	  compe77on	  may	  be	  limited	  (servicing	  Deere	  tractors)	  
•  Technology	  
•  Network/plaeorm	  economies	  
•  But	  poten7al	  compe77on	  has	  been	  circumvented	  by	  contract	  restraints,	  amplifying	  and	  extending	  market	  power	  
•  Industries	  with	  large	  upfront	  costs,	  low	  marginal	  costs	  
•  But	  if	  that	  were	  primary	  driver,	  one	  would	  have	  expected	  an	  increase	  in	  investment	  (say	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP),	  not	  a	  decrease	  
•  Big	  data	  
•  Providing	  new	  tools	  for	  price	  discrimina7on	  
•  Those	  with	  ability	  to	  discriminate	  beTer	  grow—not	  necessarily	  firms	  that	  are	  more	  efficient	  
•  Broader	  point:	  	  with	  market	  power,	  firms	  with	  higher	  “value	  added”	  may	  not	  be	  most	  efficient	  firms;	  value	  added,	  as	  we	  conven;onally	  
measure	  it,	  is	  not	  true	  “value	  added.”	  	  Includes	  large	  redistribu;ve	  element,	  redistribu;on	  from	  consumers	  to	  firms	  
•  To	  maintain	  compe;;ve	  market	  place	  in	  presence	  of	  these	  changes	  will	  require	  more	  ac;ve	  compe;;on	  
policies,	  with	  new	  tools	  and	  presump;ons	  
•  Market	  equilibrium,	  on	  its	  own,	  will	  be	  far	  from	  compe77ve	  
	  
But  innova6on  in  extending  and  amplifying  market  
power  is  a  major  factor
•  Big	  data	  (as	  discussed	  in	  previous	  slide)	  allowing	  exploita7on/price	  
discrimina7on	  
•  Innova7ve	  contracts	  with	  restraints	  
•  Merchant	  restraints	  (GDS,	  credit	  cards)	  
•  Microso\	  restraints	  
•  Bundling	  and	  non-­‐linear	  pricing	  
•  Pre-­‐emp7ve	  mergers	  
•  Techniques	  in	  extending	  effec7ve	  patent	  life	  
•  Evergreening	  
•  Data	  exclusivity	  
•  Other	  ways	  of	  undermining	  compe77on	  with	  generics	  
Major  changes  in  understandings  of  
economics  over  past  third  of  a  century
• Greater	  understandings	  of	  	  the	  limita7ons	  of	  the	  compe77ve	  
equilibrium	  model	  
•  Model	  not	  robust	  
•  Informa7on	  economics	  
•  Game	  theory	  
•  Behavioral	  Economics	  
• Presump7ons	  based	  on	  “old”	  model	  no	  longer	  hold	  
•  Irony:	  	  cri7que	  of	  standard	  compe77ve	  model	  was	  in	  full	  force	  just	  as	  model’s	  
influence	  expanded	  
•  Importance	  of	  lags	  in	  knowledge—and	  perhaps	  of	  ideology	  
New  understandings  of  the  func6oning  of  the  market  
economy
•  The	  compe77ve	  equilibrium	  model	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  good	  
descrip7on	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  
•  Pervasiveness	  of	  market	  power	  
•  	  Even	  small	  market	  power	  in	  mul7ple	  industries	  can	  add	  up	  to	  having	  large	  
effects	  
•  Market	  power/market	  imperfec7ons	  can	  be	  generated	  in	  mul7ple	  ways	  
•  Asymmetries	  of	  informa7on:	  	  small	  informa7on	  imperfec7ons	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  large	  
market	  power	  
•  Search	  costs:	  	  even	  small	  search	  costs	  can	  lead	  to	  large	  market	  power	  
•  Even	  small	  sunk	  costs	  can	  lead	  to	  large	  market	  power	  
•  And	  then	  can	  be	  amplified	  and	  extended	  in	  mul7ple	  ways	  
•  Serious	  problems	  of	  monopsony,	  especially	  in	  labor	  market	  
•  Only	  way	  to	  explain	  much	  of	  behavior	  in	  labor	  market	  
New  understandings:  dynamics
• Poten7al	  compe77on	  is	  not	  a	  subs7tute	  for	  real	  compe77on	  
•  The	  “contestability”	  doctrine	  was	  never	  robust—fell	  apart	  with	  even	  small	  
sunk	  costs;	  didn’t	  work	  in	  prac7ce	  
•  Schumpeterian	  doctrines	  (monopolies	  are	  only	  temporary,	  
compe77on	  to	  be	  monopolist	  drives	  innova7on)	  are	  also	  not	  robust	  
•  Monopolies	  can	  and	  have	  incen7ves	  to	  s7fle	  innova7on	  
• Compe77on	  policy	  needs	  to	  focus	  not	  just	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  
compe77on	  today,	  but	  on	  compe77on	  in	  the	  future	  
•  Pre-­‐emp7ve	  mergers	  
These  new  perspec6ves  require  new  
presump6ons,  new  criteria  and  tools,  and  new  
remedies•  Abuse	  of	  “efficiency	  defense”	  for	  restraints	  
•  An7-­‐compe77ve	  prac7ces	  should	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  illegal,	  unless	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  (a)	  there	  
are	  significant	  efficiency	  gains	  and	  that	  a	  significant	  propor7on	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  these	  efficiency	  gains	  
accrue	  to	  others	  than	  the	  firm;	  and	  (b)	  these	  efficiency	  gains	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  in	  a	  less	  an7-­‐
compe77ve	  manner	  
•  Example:	  	  “Two-­‐sided	  markets”	  defense	  of	  plaeorm	  restraints	  
•  In	  many	  cases,	  presence	  of	  significant	  externali7es	  not	  even	  established	  
•  In	  many	  cases,	  no	  aTempt	  to	  show	  that	  observed	  pricing	  paTerns	  are	  those	  predicted	  by	  theory	  
•  Typically,	  no	  aTempt	  at	  incidence	  theory:	  	  pretend	  that	  price	  imposed	  on	  merchant	  is	  not	  shi\ed	  to	  
consumer	  	  (as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  in	  any	  compe77ve	  model)	  
•  Typically,	  no	  aTempt	  to	  analyze	  impact	  of	  restraints	  on	  cross-­‐plaeorm	  compe77on	  (horizontal	  effects	  of	  
ver7cal	  constraints)	  
•  Wrong	  measure	  of	  output:	  	  with	  cross	  subsidies	  (e.g.	  from	  cash	  customers	  to	  credit	  card	  customers,	  
induced	  by	  restraints)	  credit	  card	  transac7on	  is	  wrong	  indicator	  of	  “well-­‐being”	  and	  efficiency	  	  
New  presump6ons
• Presump7on	  against	  preda7on	  needs	  to	  be	  changed	  
•  Preda7on	  o\en	  works,	  at	  least	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  7me,	  and	  current	  
presump7ons	  put	  undue	  burden	  on	  plain7ffs	  
•  Innova7veness	  in	  predatory	  mechanisms—American	  Airlines	  expanding	  
capacity	  to	  drive	  out	  compe7tor,	  then	  raising	  prices;	  Microso\	  charging	  zero	  
price	  for	  IE	  
• Presump7on	  against	  intervening	  in	  ver7cal	  mergers	  needs	  to	  be	  
changed	  
•  A	  ver7cal	  merger	  can	  change	  compe77ve	  landscape	  
Consumer  welfare  standard  misguided
•  Especially	  with	  monopsony	  and	  when	  long	  run	  dynamics	  are	  
important	  
•  Even	  if	  firm	  with	  monoposony	  power	  passes	  on	  some	  of	  gain	  to	  consumers,	  
there	  is	  a	  distor7on	  in	  the	  economy,	  and	  societal	  welfare	  is	  lowered	  
•  Preda7on	  may	  lower	  prices	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  but	  reduced	  compe77on	  will	  
hurt	  in	  the	  long	  run	  
•  Presump7on	  that	  more	  compe77on	  is	  valuable	  in	  itself,	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  
dynamic	  and	  flourishing	  economy,	  with	  monopoly	  rents	  	  competed	  away	  
New  approaches  to  determining  market  
power•  Market	  share	  only	  one	  indicia	  
•  In	  some	  cases,	  there	  can	  be	  large	  market	  power	  even	  with	  small	  share,	  as	  conven7onally	  measured	  
•  Best	  to	  assess	  directly:	  	  is	  there	  evidence	  of	  pricing	  power	  or	  power	  to	  force	  buyers	  (sellers)	  
to	  accept	  contract	  provisions	  that	  are	  prima	  facie	  not	  in	  their	  interests	  
•  Large	  mark-­‐up	  should	  be	  prima	  facie	  evidence	  of	  market	  power	  
•  Usurious	  interest	  rates	  by	  banks	  
•  Price	  discrimina7on:	  	  If	  it	  pays	  to	  sell	  to	  some	  firm	  (consumer)	  at	  a	  low	  price,	  then	  selling	  to	  another	  
at	  a	  high	  price	  should	  be	  prima	  facie	  evidence	  of	  market	  power,	  unless	  Defendant	  can	  show	  that	  they	  
are	  jus7fied	  by	  costs	  differences	  
•  Forcing	  buyers	  to	  acceptable	  terms	  that	  should	  be	  unacceptable	  	  
•  Arbitra7on	  clauses	  
•  Consumer	  protec7on	  needs	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  “transparency”	  of	  contracts	  
•  Other	  considera7ons	  may	  reinforce	  conclusion	  that	  a	  market	  constraint	  is	  an7-­‐compe77ve	  




Simplifica6ons  of  past  are  not  acceptable
•  There	  are	  some	  case	  where	  one	  can	  reliably	  ascertain	  incidence,	  
without	  full	  general	  equilibrium	  analysis	  
•  Illinois	  Brick	  puts	  a	  constraint	  on	  an7-­‐trust	  enforcement	  
•  Going	  beyond	  it	  would	  be	  able	  to	  aTack	  some	  obvious	  cases	  of	  an7-­‐
compe77ve	  behavior	  that	  have	  been	  le\	  unaddressed	  
New  remedies
•  Need	  innova7on	  in	  remedies	  corresponding	  to	  changes	  in	  economy	  (including	  innova7on	  in	  
an7-­‐compe77ve	  prac7ces)	  
•  Recognizing	  that	  market	  power,	  once	  established,	  can	  persist:	  	  strong	  hysteresis	  effects	  
•  Again,	  markedly	  different	  perspec7ve	  than	  that	  of	  “Chicago	  School”	  
•  Recognizing	  that	  firms	  have	  incen7ve	  and	  ability	  to	  circumvent/innovate	  to	  reestablish	  market	  
power	  
•  Will	  require	  more	  Court	  oversight	  
•  New	  natural	  monopolies/oligopolies	  need	  new	  policies	  
•  Just	  because	  market	  power	  arises	  from	  technology	  doesn’t	  mean	  we	  should	  do	  nothing	  
•  May	  require	  even	  more	  intense	  scru7ny	  of	  behavior,	  stronger	  policies	  to	  prevent	  leveraging	  
market	  power	  	  
•  structural	  policies	  (break-­‐ups,	  prohibi7ons	  from	  going	  into	  downstream	  or	  upstream	  ac7vi7es)	  
•  Typically,	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  have	  been	  exaggerated,	  seldom	  established	  
•  Regulatory	  policies:	  	  non-­‐discrimina7on	  
Stronger  remedies
•  Restric7ons	  on	  an7-­‐compe77ve	  prac7ces	  (EU	  ac7ons	  against	  Google),	  contracts/
constraints,	  forbidding	  pre-­‐emp7ve	  mergers	  and	  ver7cal	  mergers	  and	  acquisi7ons	  
that	  might	  adversely	  affect	  compe77on,	  	  restric7ons	  on	  IPR	  (patent	  pools,	  
compulsory	  licensing,	  shortened	  patent	  life)	  
•  More	  ac7ve	  consumer	  protec7on—e.g.	  proscribing	  arbitra7on	  clauses,	  
transparency	  requirements	  
•  Net	  neutrality	  is	  a	  compe77on	  issue	  
•  Abusive	  of	  market	  power—however	  acquired—should	  be	  illegal	  
•  Temporary	  regula7on	  of	  pricing	  (e.g.	  of	  merchant	  fees	  in	  credit	  cards,	  as	  in	  
Durban	  Amendment),	  un7l	  compe77on	  is	  restored	  
Lack  of  workers’  bargaining  power  is  a  
compe66on  issue
• Results	  in	  abusive	  working	  condi7ons	  
• Results	  in	  low	  wages	  
• Contributed	  to	  by	  globaliza7on	  	  
•  Compe77on	  authori7es	  should	  ar7culate	  consequences	  of	  trade	  agreements	  
for	  compe77on—including	  workers’	  bargaining	  power	  
Big  data  and  privacy
•  Represents	  one	  of	  biggest	  challenges	  to	  our	  society,	  and	  to	  compe77on	  law	  
and	  consumer	  protec7on	  
•  Individuals	  o\en	  don’t	  know	  value	  of	  data	  that	  they	  are	  giving	  to	  companies—or	  even	  
that	  their	  data	  is	  being	  taken	  
•  May	  be	  returns	  to	  scale	  in	  data—giving	  those	  with	  more	  data	  a	  compe77ve	  
advantage	  
•  Enhanced	  when	  they	  can	  combine	  their	  data	  with	  others	  
•  In	  some	  cases,	  there	  may	  be	  social	  value	  in	  the	  data;	  in	  many	  other	  cases,	  
data	  is	  being	  used	  to	  extract	  more	  consumer	  surplus	  out	  of	  buyers	  
•  An	  undesirable	  redistribu7on,	  which	  may	  actually	  impede	  economic	  efficiency	  
•  LiTle	  evidence	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  two	  
•  At	  the	  very	  least,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  far	  stronger	  regula7on	  on	  individual	  privacy	  and	  the	  
transparency	  of	  those	  who	  acquire	  data,	  on	  combining	  data	  sets,	  on	  the	  uses	  to	  which	  
data	  can	  be	  put	  
In  some  areas  concentra6on  of  market  power  
are  especially  problema6c
• Market	  place	  of	  ideas:	  	  media	  
•  Mistake	  to	  view	  it	  only	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  delivering	  adver7sing	  
•  Concentra7on	  of	  media	  in	  a	  few	  hands	  can	  reduce	  compe77on	  in	  the	  market	  
place	  for	  ideas	  
The  6me  is  ripe  for  a  re-­‐examina6on  of  our  
compe66on  and  consumer  protec6on  laws
•  Our	  economy	  has	  changed	  and	  our	  understanding	  of	  economics	  have	  changed	  
•  And	  we	  can	  beTer	  grasp	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  exis7ng	  legal	  framework	  
•  But	  the	  underlying	  poli7cal	  and	  economic	  concerns	  about	  power	  and	  
exploita7on	  that	  drove	  the	  original	  legisla7on	  are	  s7ll	  present—even	  more	  so	  
•  Compe77on	  law	  has	  been	  excessively	  narrowed,	  and	  excessively	  influenced	  
by	  presump7ons	  concerning	  a	  compe77ve	  market	  place	  
•  Today,	  compe77on	  and	  consumer	  protec7on	  law	  needs	  to	  be	  broadened,	  to	  
incorporate	  the	  reali7es	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  and	  the	  insights	  of	  modern	  
economics	  
